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I. INTRODUCTION 
The essential feature that is new about the "New Economy" is its in-
creased dependence on products and services that are the embodiment of 
ideas. Examples include such diverse products as computer software, 
Internet services, biotechnology, and new forms of communications-
generally, the fastest growing segments of the present economy. In each of 
these areas, the "product" or "service" is a piece of intellectual property 
such as a line of computer code, a new connecting device to make routers 
and servers more efficient, or new knowledge about genetic profiling that 
facilitates the use of gene therapy products to treat disease. A major chal-
lenge over the next decade will be to identify policies that will allow a 
market economy to thrive in the context of this intellectual property revo-
lution. More narrowly, questions abound concerning the role of conven-
tional antitrust enforcement policy in these new areas. 
In my view, it is unduly simplistic to assert that intellectual property is 
just another form of property.! There are important differences. But it is 
also rather naive to conclude, as some have urged, that antitrust enforce-
ment has little or no role to play when it comes to market power based on 
intellectual property.2 In the remainder of this discussion it will be as-
sumed-as almost all commentators have assumed-that antitrust is suffi-
ciently flexible that it can playa useful role in the New Economy. 3 
1. In the U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property § 2.1 (1995), http://www.usdoj/OsI2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf, 
there are statements to the effect that the same general antitrust principles that apply to 
any form of tangible or intangible property should apply to conduct involving intellectual 
property. But the Guidelines then go on to note that "[iJntellectual property has important 
characteristics, such as ease of misappropriation, that distinguish it from many other 
forms of property." See also Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: 
From Adversaries to Partners, 28 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N Q.J. 1,7-8 (2000) (dis-
cussing interplay between antitrust and intellectual property law and the genesis and prin-
ciples of the Guidelines' approach). As this discussion will develop, the antitrust laws 
should apply fully to intellectual property-certainly no broad exemption is justified-
but in application must take important special characteristics of intellectual property into 
account. 
2. David J. Teece and Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analy-
sis in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801,843,846 (1998); Robert J. 
Barro, Why the Antitrust Cops Should Lay Off High-Tech, Bus. WK., Aug. 17, 1998, at 
20. 
3. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Joshua 
Lerner & Scott Stem eds., forthcoming 2001), at hup://haas.berkeley.edu/-shapiro/ 
thicket.pdf; David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven, Antitrust Remedies in High Technol-
ogy Industries, ANTITRUST REp. 22 (Jan. 1999); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New 
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The New Economy differs in degree rather than kind from the "old" 
economy. Part II of this discussion examines the key differences that de-
fine the New Economy. Part ill turns to several implications of those dif-
ferences as they pertain to antitrust enforcement. I argue that the differ-
ences do not justify sweeping generalizations that antitrust enforcement 
has no place in the New Economy, but do require antitrust enforcement to 
make adjustments and exercise sensitivity towards intellectual property 
issues on a case-by-case basis. The goal of a coherent overall competition 
policy, in deciding both what conduct to enforce against and what reme-
dies to require, should be to achieve an appropriate balance between the 
complementary legal regimes of intellectual property and antitrust. Part IV 
examines several examples of recent antitrust enforcement decisions in-
volving intellectual property. Without addressing the ultimate merits of 
individual decisions, I find that antitrust enforcement has generally 
evolved in recent years in a way that pays heed to the distinctive 
characteristics of the New Economy. These decisions demonstrate a con-
certed attempt to give reasonable, fact-specific consideration to both 
incentives and opportunities to innovate. Finally, to supplement the 
preceding review of substantive issues, Part V examines the institutional 
challenges posed to antitrust enforcement by the New Economy. 
II. WHAT IS NEW ABOUT THE NEW ECONOMY? 
There are three differences relating to the New Economy that any sen-
sible competition policy must take into account. 
A. Differences in Fundamental Economics 
Products and services based on intellectual property are usually char-
acterized by large initial investments ("fixed costs") and low costs to re-
produce individual items ("variable costs"). For example, once a new line 
of computer code is developed and introduced, the cost to the seller of du-
plicating that code and making it available to others approaches zero; once 
Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Speech Deliv-
ered Before the American Antitrust Institute Conference: An Agenda for Antitrust in the 
21st Century (June 15, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.htm; 
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, Speech Delivered at the ALI-ABA 
Conference (Sept. 14, 2000), http://www.ali-aba.org/aliaba/Posner_lOIIOO.htm; Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network 
Industries, Speech Delivered Before the Software Publishers Ass'n Spring Symposium 
(Mar. 24, 1998), hup://www.usdoj.gov:80/atr/puhlic/speeches/161I.htm; Lawrence H. 
Summers, The New Wealth of Nations, Remarks at the Hambrecht & Quist Technology 
Conference (May 10, 2000), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/ps617.htm. 
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a new discovery is made about a biotechnology treatment for a disease, the 
cost of producing the pharmaceutical product is very little compared to the 
investment in research. Because the cost of producing additional items is 
so low, sellers find it to their advantage to add purchasers and users; hence 
price in the short-run often declines in an effort by the seller to expand 
sales.4 It logically follows that competition to be the first to generate prod-
ucts and services covered by intellectual property protection is therefore 
beneficial for consumers and should be encouraged and preserved. 
There is, however, bad news. Because of the nature of competition in 
markets characterized by intellectual property, there is a tendency to drift 
toward single-firm dominance and even monopoly for two reasons. First, 
in order to encourage initial investments, the law provides intellectual 
property protection (primarily via patent and copyright law)5 and, in ef-
fect, precludes competition within the scope of the intellectual property for 
a period of time. Second, products and services based on intellectual prop-
4. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 28 (1999) ("With 
information goods, unit costs of production are negligible and supply chain management 
and related techniques usually don't help much with the first-copy costs. The key to re-
ducing average cost in information markets is to increase sales volume."). As Judge Pos-
ner explains: 
Intellectual property is characterized by heavy fixed costs relative to 
marginal costs. It is expensive to create but once created the cost of 
making additional copies is low, dramatically so in the case of soft-
ware, where it is only a slight overstatement to speak of marginal cost 
as zero. Without legal protection, the creator of IP may be unable to re-
coup his investment, because competitors can free ride on it; and so le-
gal protection can expand, rather than as the usual case with monopoly 
contract, output. 
Posner, supra note 3, at 2. 
5. In addition to patent and copyright law, various other intellectual property laws 
or quasi-intellectual property laws, including trade secret law and statutory proposals for 
database protection, serve the economic function of rewarding creative or inventive effort 
with competitive exclusivity, thus trading off the benefit to customers of competition 
against the benefits of encouraging innovation. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); The 
Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1858 Before 
the Subcomm. On Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House 
Comm. On Commerce, 106th Congo 78 (1999) (statement of the FTC). Trademarks are 
better dealt with separately, however, because while some common issues arise, they 
involve an economic tradeoff with different implications for antitrust law. The economic 
purpose of trademark law is not in general to encourage innovation and creativity, but 
instead to reduce consumer search costs by identifying the source of goods, and thereby 
incidentally to encourage quality by protecting reputation. See William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
269-270 (1987). 
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erty frequently exhibit "network effects," i.e., each individual's demand 
for a particular company's product or service is positively related to its 
widespread use by others. This phenomenon can most clearly be seen with 
respect to communications equipment (local telephone, fax, and e-mail), 
which becomes more valuable to users as more people use the service. 
These network effects can also be indirect-situations in which producers 
of complementary goods design and manufacture those complements to 
work with the goods of the single dominant firm. This leaves potential 
challengers of that dominant firm without access to the complementary 
goods or with the burden of producing the complementary goods them-
selves. The exclusionary rights granted by intellectual property protection, 
coupled with trends toward standardization due to network effects, 
threaten to diminish market competition. Where this results in monopoly 
or near-monopoly, there can be negative effects not only on price and out-
put, but also on innovation, as the diversity of competing research and de-
velopment programs and the pressure on the incumbent to innovate and 
stay ahead of competition are lost. 6 
It is important to recognize these characteristics, but they should not be 
exaggerated. There are numerous non-intellectual property products with 
high fixed and low variable costs (e.g., incinerators and transport indus-
tries)7 and pronounced network effects (e.g., credit cards). On average and 
across the economy, however, these trends appear more frequently in mar-
kets characterized by intellectual property. 
In sum, incentives to innovate must be protected in intellectual prop-
erty markets and innovation competition can yield great consumer bene-
fits. On the other hand, threats to competition can be substantial. For ex-
ample, the combination of intellectual property protection and network 
effects will almost inevitably lead to monopoly and the monopoly can di-
minish or eliminate future innovation. The challenge for antitrust is to deal 
with these economic conditions by preserving competition without unrea-
sonably undermining incentives to innovate. 
6. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 120 F.T.C. 928 (1995). As explained infra, 
the Silicon Graphics vertical merger case involved an acquisition of software providers 
by the dominant entertainment graphics workstation provider. Standard vertical foreclo-
sure concerns were exacerbated in the circumstances by indirect network effects-the 
entrenchment of its workstation dominance by the production by various software firms 
of software dedicated to its workstation-and innovation competition was threatened by 
Silicon Graphics' monopoly power. 
7. As SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 4, at 22, point out, "It costs United a huge 
amount to purchase and operate a 747, but the incremental cost of an additional passenger 
is tiny, so long as the plane is not full." 
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B. Importance of Innovation in a Dynamic Economy 
Traditionally, antitrust has focused primarily, though not exclusively, 
on price and output effects.8 Antitrust enforcers ask whether a particular 
transaction is likely to allow the parties to raise price to the disadvantage 
of consumers, lower price drastically so as to drive out competitors and 
eventually injure consumers, or achieve comparable effects from other ex-
clusionary conduct.9 
In the New Economy, however, the success of competition is fre-
quently based on qualitative rather than quantitative factors: the key is not 
so much who can produce the most widgets at the lowest cost, but rather 
who can be the first to design, protect with intellectual property rights, and 
bring to market a new and improved widget. 1o Because market partici-
pants' incentives and opportunities to innovate are increasingly important 
in the intellectual property-intensive new economy, a rational competition 
policy will pay more heed to the effects of market structure, competitive 
conduct, and enforcement on innovation than it paid in industries where 
cost minimization was the most significant dimension of efficient 
competition. 
In markets where innovation is important, it has been suggested that 
larger firms may enjoy advantages in innovation, thereby producing con-
sumer benefits that dwarf any loss of price competition due to increased 
market concentration. The seminal (though still controversial) statement of 
the general argument that concentration may favor innovation appears in 
Joseph Schumpeter's book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, and 
emphasizes economies of scale which assist large companies to be effi-
cient in research and development. II Others have argued that innovation 
may be spurred by corporate size because firms are able to spread the cost 
8. See, e.g., u.s. Dep't of Justice & FfC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 
(1992), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelineslhoriz_booklhmgl.htm [hereinafter 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines] (describing the Guidelines' fundamental concern with 
"market power" in terms of price and output); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: 
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 13 (1976) (describing the "costs of monopoly" by reference 
to a demand curve charting the relationship between output and price). 
9. See, e.g., Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 8, § 0.1 (mergers allowing 
parties to raise price); Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 u.s. 
209 (1993) (predatory pricing); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993) 
(monopolization). 
10. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 4 (emphasizing the importance of the 
"first-mover advantage" in the New Economy). 
II. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITAUSM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY chs. 5-8 
(1950). 
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of innovation across a larger output base, accelerate implementation of 
innovations, and diversify risks. 12 
While concentration may increase the dominant firm's ability to inno-
vate, the lack of competition may weaken its incentives, and may deprive 
the market of smaller firms who may have other innovations to offer. As 
discussed in the next section, the issue is not so much whether the incen-
tives and abilities of market participants to innovate should be protected-
all agree on that-but how best to do so while at the same time preserving 
the ability of other firms to challenge the technological incumbent and 
promote both price and innovation competition. 
C. Uncertain Durability of Market Power 
While comprehensive empirical data is lacking, there is a widely held 
view that markets in the New Economy are characterized by an increased 
rate of innovation, relative ease of entry, and instability of market shares. 
As a result, the argument proceeds, cartels and monopoly power in intel-
lectual property markets will necessarily be short-lived, and in any event, 
will be defeated more quickly and efficiently by market forces such as 
new entry and innovation than by any band of bureaucrats. i3 
By and large, these claims have some merit. On average, market power 
is probably less durable in the high-technology sector of the economy. As 
a result, it is unlikely that any dominant firm will eclipse competition for 
fifty years to the extent and in the way that Alcoa dominated the alumi-
num market in the first half of the twentieth century.14 
Nevertheless, these concerns have not vanished entirely from the face 
of the economy due to the intellectual property revolution. We have al-
ready seen that systems designed to encourage and protect innovation such 
as patents and copyrights can be-and often are-used to barricade a mar-
ket against entry by new rivals. Furthermore, it appears that network ef-
fects occur more frequently in sectors of the economy characterized by 
intellectual property. Such factors as brand name recognition and reputa-
12. See, e.g., FTC Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition (Nov. 2, 
1995) (statement of Steven C. Salop, Efficiencies in Dynamic Merger Analysis), 
hup://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/saloptst.htm. In recent years, it appears that growth in 
R&D investment has been concentrated in smaller firms. "Between 1993 and 1998, real 
spending on R&D by firms with more than 25,000 employees increased by 8 percent, but 
R&D conducted by firms with fewer than 500 employees nearly doubled." ECONOMIC 
REpORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 107-2, at 112 (2001). 
13. Cf SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 4, at 305 ("certain high-tech industries are 
highly dynamic, making any monopoly power transitory"). 
14. For a description of Alcoa's dominance, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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tion for reliability can create substantial advantages for incumbents, fur-
ther impeding market entry by new competitors. Finally, practices illegal 
under the antitrust laws such as exclusionary conduct or intimidation tac-
tics available to only very large firms can themselves impede entry by 
more efficient challengers. Market dominance for "only" fifteen or twenty 
years can take enormous resources out of the economy and, by excluding 
innovative new entrants, foreclose alternative paths of technical develop-
ment. 
In the end, the question of whether market power is durable or ephem-
eral is fact-specific and needs to be addressed on a market-by-market and 
product-by-product basis. At a minimum, however, casual, across-the-
board views that antitrust has no role to play in the New Economy since 
market power is weak and ephemeral are unfounded. 
III. STRIKING THE BALANCE: HOW SHOULD ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT RESPOND TO THESE DIFFERENCES? 
Both reasonable intellectual property protection and effective antitrust 
enforcement will encourage innovation. Intellectual property rights subsi-
dize investments in innovation by granting substantial, but time-limited, 
market power. Antitrust ensures that firms compete, and by competing, 
seek new roads to innovation. It also prevents dominant firms from harm-
ing or retarding innovation. Balance in the substantive rules of intellectual 
property and antitrust law, as well as sensitivity to innovation issues at the 
remedial stage, are the two essential ingredients of a rational legal re-
sponse to the realities of the New Economy. 
A. Protecting (Without Overprotecting) Incentives to Innovate 
Virtually all agree that some level of intellectual property protection, 
specifically involving a patent and copyright system, is justified. But al-
most all further recognize that such protection is a double-edged sword. 15 
On the one hand, it properly encourages and rewards innovation, and pre-
vents misappropriation. On the other hand, it prevents competition for a 
period of time within the zone of the intellectual property grant. 16 A legal 
15. See, e.g., I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § l.03[A] (2000) (noting the general "as-
sumption that in the absence of ... public benefit [in the form of promoting creativity], 
the grant of a copyright monopoly to individuals would be unjustified."). 
16. For example. since much innovation consists of improvement on basic ideas, 
patent protection of the basic idea may preclude the very improvements that it is designed 
to encourage. See, e.g., 1 PrC, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETlTlON POUCY 
IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE ch. 6 (1996) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of preserving opportunities for follow-on innovation). 
HeinOnline -- 16 Berk. Tech. L.J. 543 2001
2001] ANTITRUST AND THE NEW ECONOMY 543 
system that overprotects intellectual property and underenforces antitrust 
law thus poses dangers to competition and ultimately to innovation, just as 
one that underprotects intellectual property and overenforces antitrust 
principles can harm incentives to innovate. The central challenge posed by 
the New Economy is to strike an appropriate balance. In doing so, two dif-
ficult questions need to be addressed. First, in the context of the New 
Economy, is the present level of intellectual property protection roughly 
adequate or does it under or overcompensate innovation? Second, has anti-
trust enforcement adequately acknowledged the importance of protecting 
incentives to innovate? 
With respect to the level of intellectual property protection, much 
work needs to be done to evaluate how intellectual property protection op-
erates today. Many suspect that the present system is seriously flawed. 17 It 
should be a matter of concern that patent applications and patent grants in 
the United States are at an all-time high, and the patent rate per dollar of 
17. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Break-
fast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 577 (1999) (arguing that the growing volume of patents and the emergence of 
new types of patents such as business method patents reinforce a general need for new 
procedures, such as a European-style patent opposition system, and a reform of patent 
examiners' training and incentives, to minimize the granting of invalid patents); Law-
rence Lessig, The Problem with Patents, THE STANDARD, Apr. 23, 1999, at 
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151 ,4296,00.html (describing workloads 
and incentives at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTa") as a significant contribu-
tor, along with the high cost of litigating against invalid patents, to the growing problem 
of "bad patents," especially bad business method patents, which become "the space de-
bris of cyberspace"); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. 
U.L. REv. (forthcoming Sept. 2001) (arguing that litigation is more cost-effective than 
increasing examination of patent applications and that the presumption of patent validity 
should be relaxed); MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFfWARE AND INTERNET LAW 333-34 
(2000) (discussing specific weaknesses in the PTa's scrutiny of software patents in the 
1990s); Jeff Bezos, An Open Letter on the Subject of Patents, at http://www.amazon. 
com/exec/obidos/substlmisc/patents.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2001) (arguing that busi-
ness method and software patents should be limited to three to five years' duration and 
subjected to public comment before issuance); see also COMMfITEE ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE & COMPUTER 
SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, 
MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS, NATIONAL RESOURCE COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DI-
LEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 228· (2000) ("The past 
decade has seen a substantial de facto broadening of items for which patents can be ob-
tained, including information inventions such as computer programming, information 
design, and business methods. The long-term effects of this trend are as yet unclear, al-
though the near-term consequences are worrisome."). 
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research and development ("R&D") is the highest since 1977. 18 Perhaps 
there are innocent explanations, or it may be that the "system" drives 
companies to seek-and the government to grant-more flimsy intellec-
tual property rights than are justified. 
For example, take patent policy. An evaluation of levels of protection 
is beyond the scope of this discussion, but any resolution of the relation-
ship between antitrust and intellectual property must address some or all 
of the following questions: (1) Does the patent office have the resources 
to conduct a rigorous review of patent applications? (2) Are patent grants 
justified in terms of utility, novelty, and invention, or is the scope of pat-
ents that are granted unnecessarily broad? (3) Is the duration of patent pro-
tection always-or even usually--essential to stimulate and reward inno-
vation, or would lead time to the innovator and secrecy adequately reward 
much innovation, and if the latter is true, what policy justifies granting as 
many broad patents as are issued today? (4) Is private litigation a sensible 
way to work out patent controversies, especially with respect to the scope 
of the patent? and (5) Are patents abused (e.g., are many patent applica-
tions designed to create a thicket of uncertain scope primarily to preclude 
competitive challenges)?19 
Without reliable answers to these questions, it will be difficult to de-
cide whether the balance between antitrust and intellectual property pro-
tection is roughly correct. Even if our government grants more patents 
than are essential to encourage innovation, and protects patent rights to an 
undue extent-and I tend to agree with those who are skeptical about the 
advantages of current patent pOlicy20-there is a still more difficult issue 
to address: namely, the possibility that generous compensation via broad 
patent grants in computer software and pharmaceuticals is a sensible price 
to pay in order to drive the economy to higher levels of productivity and 
generate higher levels of consumer welfare. 
With respect to antitrust's overall acknowledgement of the need for 
innovation, antitrust historically has often, if not always, been sensitive to 
the value of innovation. For example, since the passage of the Sherman 
Act in 1890, there has been only one federal government challenge to a 
research and development joint venture-a classic example of innovative 
18. See Linda Cohen & Roger Noll, Is U.S. Science Policy at Risk?, BROOKINGS 
REv., Jan. 1,2001, at 10. This per dollar rate increase also comes at a time when private 
sector investment in R&D has increased at an impressive 8 percent per year in 1995-99. 
ECONOMIC REpORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. DOc. No. 107-2, at III (2001). 
19. On this last question, see Shapiro, supra note 3, at 3. 
20. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 11. 
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arrangements. 21 It would be difficult to imagine a more lenient record. 
When competitors control patents that include legitimate conflicting 
claims so that neither can reach the market, the courts have consistently 
allowed cross-licenses, even where such licenses incorporated agreements 
on price?2 Access to information about a monopolist's product may be 
essential for manufacturers of complementary products or services to 
compete. A leading court decision concluded, however, that there is no 
obligation to pre-disclose, even for a monopolist, because any such duty 
would tend to discourage aggressive competition and innovation?3 Fi-
nally, evidence of an intent on the part of antitrust enforcers to avoid un-
necessary interference with incentives to innovate is found throughout the 
recently issued Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")IDepartment of Justice 
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors. 24 Part IV of 
this discussion will examine further whether antitrust law enforcement 
(and nonenforcement), including consent orders, has paid adequate atten-
tion in the last half-dozen years to the preservation of legitimate incentives 
to innovate. For the purposes of this part of the discussion, however, it is 
clear that antitrust certainly values innovation as a policy goal. 
While antitrust enforcement's general sensitivity to the value of inno-
vation is certainly appropriate, it should not be taken too far. An approach 
that grants broad exceptions to antitrust principles in favor of intellectual 
property holders distorts the balance too far in the direction of incentives 
to innovate by sacrificing too much in the way of competition and oppor-
tunities for follow-on innovation. A striking example of an approach that 
gives undue weight to intellectual property rights is the recent Federal Cir-
21. See Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1969), 
aff'd sub nom., City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970). Even here, the 
case went beyond a simple R&D joint venture. The case ended in a consent agreement 
resolving charges that the Auto Manufacturers Association, General Motors, Ford, Chrys-
ler, and American Motors Corp. had conspired with other motor vehicle manufacturers to 
eliminate competition in the research, development, manufacture and installation of mo-
tor vehicle air pollution control equipment, and in the purchase from others of related 
patent rights. 
22. The leading case is Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 
(1931). 
23. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
24. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among 
Competitors § 3.31 (a) (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (con-
cluding that R&D agreements are usually procompetitive). 
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cuit decision in CSU v. Xerox Corp.,25 which concluded that a legitimate 
holder of a patent or copyright can refuse to license anyone, regardless of 
intent or effect on competition. The court held that the refusal is exempt 
from the antitrust laws unless the intellectual property was obtained by 
fraud, the infringement suit is a sham to cover an intent to injure a com-
petitor, or the refusal is part of a tie-in sale strategy.26 In effect, the Federal 
Circuit has leapt from the undeniable premise that an intellectual property 
holder does not have to license anyone in the first instance to the unjustifi-
able conclusions that it can select among licensees or can condition a li-
cense to achieve an anticompetitive effect. For example, you receive a li-
cense only if you agree not to do business with my competitor. That ap-
proach to the tradeoff between intellectual property and antitrust gives in-
tellectual property an inappropriate weight in the traditional balancing 
process,27 allowing intellectual property holders to extend their market 
power beyond the scope of the intellectual property right itself and sacri-
ficing more competition than is necessary to provide appropriate incen-
tives to innovate. 
B. Designing Remedies for the New Economy 
As in other areas of antitrust, most antitrust cases involving intellectual 
property are settled outside of court. Because areas of the economy 
characterized by intellectual property are usually dynamic rather than 
static, reliable predictions are difficult, thereby making effective remedies 
hard to formulate. From the point of view of antitrust enforcement, 
remedial questions are a particular challenge in addressing intellectual 
25. Now renamed as In re Indep. Servo Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
26. Id. at 1326. 
27. See Townshend V. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. C99-0400, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5070 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2000) (illustrating the way CSU v. Xerox may be misused). In 
that case, the owners of basic patents underlying the 56k modem technology sued for 
patent infringement. The co-defendant, Rockwell, asserted antitrust counterclaims alleg-
ing that the patents on which the suit was based were invalid, the technology under the 
patents had been adopted as part of an industry standard through fraud on a trade associa-
tion and its members, and the patents were made available to competitors only on the 
condition that they cross-license their technology to the patent holder. The district court 
dismissed the antitrust counterclaims, "[b]ecause a patent owner has the legal right to 
refuse to license his or her patent on any terms, [and therefore] the existence of a predi-
cate condition to a license agreement cannot state the antitrust violation." Id. at *26. To 
the same effect, see Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1292-93 (N.D. 
Ala. 2000) (supporting the proposition that it is not an antitrust violation to refuse to li-
cense a patent). 
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property issues in a way that alleviates competitive problems without un-
duly interfering with innovation incentives. Among the issues that need to 
be addressed are the following: (1) enforcement officials and the courts 
must be cautious when imposing remedial conditions so as not to under-
mine innovation; (2) special attention needs to be given to the duration of 
orders, with duration often curtailed because market changes in high-
technology markets with much intellectual property are likely to make 
those long-term orders obsolete, if not downright harmful; and (3) where 
network effects are present or pose a threat, there must be special attention 
given to designing a remedy that ensures reasonable access to the bottle-
neck product or service.28 
Any effective remedial structure should take all of these factors into 
account. These issues are discussed more fully below in connection with 
actual cases settled or litigated by the FfC in the last several years. 
IV. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES: HAS ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT ADJUSTED WHEN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IS INVOLVED? 
To recapitulate, in markets characterized by the presence of intellec-
tual property, antitrust must face the following special, though not unique, 
market characteristics: particular importance of incentives to innovate; 
critical importance of competition at the research and development level; 
dynamic markets and often, though not always, unstable market shares; 
and uncertainty about the way markets will develop. A rational response to 
these characteristics does not involve sweeping generalizations or a 
wholesale abandonment of antitrust principles, but does require sensitivity 
to the balance between intellectual property and antitrust and careful tai-
loring of remedies to the particular facts of the case in order to preserve 
incentives to innovate. 
28. Perhaps the most perplexing question about how the antitrust laws should apply 
to intellectual property concerns entrenched market power achieved as a result of network 
effects. That issue deserves an entire paper of its own and is beyond the scope of this 
discussion. I have attempted to address those issues elsewhere. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust 
Analysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19th Century Discipline Addresses 21 sl Century 
Problems, Remarks at the Am. Bar Ass'n Antitrust Section's Antitrust Issues in High-
Tech Industries Workshop (Feb. 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofskylhitch.htm. 
My tentative conclusion there was that antitrust should be cautious in challenging legally 
achieved market power based on network effects, and with rare exceptions, should con-
centrate on its traditional role of ensuring that companies achieve market power through 
legitimate competitive conduct, and that they maintain their network dominance only 
through superior skill, foresight, and industry-not by exclusionary conduct. 
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How has antitrust enforcement responded in practice? In reviewing a 
sample of FTC enforcement initiatives over the last half-dozen years, my 
goal is not to demonstrate that the Commission was always correct. Cases 
that go to litigation or involve lengthy settlement negotiations usually in-
volve close calls, and any individual enforcement decision could be de-
bated. My goal rather is to determine whether enforcement and nonen-
forcement decisions took into account the special characteristics of intel-
lectual property markets that I have addressed in the first half of this dis-
cussion. 
A. Agreements That Have the Effect of Extending Patent 
Duration - Hoechst-Andr:f9 and Abbott-Geneva30 
In the past year, the FTC brought two actions that raised similar issues 
involving settlements of patent disputes between brand name and generic 
companies. Under federal law, the first company to file an application 
with the Food and Drug Administration to market a generic bio-equivalent 
to a brand name drug is given a 180-day period of exclusivity after the 
patent expires or is declared invalid in a patent suit?l The 180-day period 
does not begin to run until the generic comes to market.32 During this 
time, other generic competitors are prohibited from coming to market. 33 In 
both Abbott-Geneva and Hoechst-Andrx, the branded pharmaceutical 
company paid the first-to-file generic company a large sum of money, ex-
ceeding the amount of money the generic company might otherwise have 
earned by independently marketing the product, to keep the generic ver-
sion off the market. 34 The agreements thus acted as corks in a bottle, pre-
cluding competition not only by the generic company paid not to chal-
lenge the branded pharmaceutical, but also by other potential generic 
competitors because the 180-day period would not begin to run until the 
generic came to market. Each agreement contained additional terms, in-
cluding provisions that the generic company would not transfer or relin-
29· In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293, 2000 F.T.C. LEXIS 16 (Mar. 16, 
2000). 
30. In re Abbott Labs. & Geneva Phannaceuticals, Inc., Nos. C-3945 & C-3946, 
2000 F.T.C. LEXIS 65 (Mar. 16, 2000). 
31. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act, 21 
U.S.c. § 355 (1994). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See Abbott Labs., 2000 F.T.C LEXIS 65, at *14; Hoechst Marion Roussel, 2000 
F.T.C. LEXIS 16, at *12-17. 
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quish its l80-day exclusivity period, or would not even market noninfring-
ing generic forms of the branded company's drugs.35 
Absent the agreements, the branded pharmaceutical house and the ge-
neric house would likely have engaged in extended patent litigation as to 
whether the patent was invalid and/or infringed by the generic. In general, 
encouraging settlements of patent litigation facilitates innovation. In these 
cases, however, the key provision effectively paying the generic to stay off 
the market and thereby precluding others from entering the market, along 
with ancillary provisions blocking competing sales, led the Commission to 
conclude that the primary purpose and effect of the arrangement was to 
extend the de facto duration of the patent by private agreement.36 At least 
to my mind, these arrangements did little to encourage innovation. 
B. Refusals to License by a Monopolist-In re Intel Corp. 37 
In one of the most widely noted antitrust enforcement actions involv-
ing intellectual property, the Commission in 1998 issued a complaint 
against the Intel Corporation. The complaint alleged that Intel was a mo-
nopolist in the microprocessor market and that it had sought to maintain its 
dominance by denying essential technical information and product sam-
ples of new microprocessors to companies that, because of intellectual 
property disputes, had initiated or threatened to initiate litigation against 
Intel or Intel's customers.38 Intel's goal, according to the complaint, was to 
coerce other companies to license their intellectual froperty on terms fa-
vorable to Intel, rather than to resort to the courts.3 Intel had previously 
provided the information and samples to many of its customers and cus-
tomer-competitors, but withdrew these advantages from those who found 
themselves in intellectual property disputes with Inte1.40 The Commission 
alleged that anticompetitive effects included discouraging innovation ef-
forts by potential challengers in microprocessor technology.41 
In settling the case, Intel agreed that it would not withhold or threaten 
to withhold product or technical information for reasons relating to an in-
35. See Abbott Labs., 2000 F.T.C. LEXIS 65, at *10; Hoechst Marion Roussel, 2000 
F.T.C. LEXIS 16, at *12-17. 
36. See Abbott Labs., 2000 FTC LEXIS 65; Hoechst Marion Roussel, 2000 F.T.C. 
LEXIS 16. 
37. In re Intel Corp., No. 9288, 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 145 (Aug. 3, 1999). For further 
discussion of Intel, and of the Dell and Ciba-GeigylSandoz cases discussed infra, see An-
thony, supra note 1. 
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tellectual property dispute.42 The Commission agreed to qualify this provi-
sion by acknowledging that an intellectual property holder, including a 
monopolist like the Commission alleged Intel to be, would be free to 
withhold licenses of its product or information in the first instance, but 
would not to be able to curtail its supply when the customer sought to vin-
dicate its intellectual property rights through a range of legal and equitable 
remedies.43 Intel would also be free to discontinue a license when a cus-
tomer or competitor sought an injunction against Intel's sale of its micro-
processors.44 The order thus gave the challenger a choice of waiving that 
remedy. If the challenger refused to waive, then Intel would be allowed to 
discontinue providing information or the product. 
The goal of the order was to avoid a "compulsory licensing" regime, 
even by an alleged monopolist, because of the adverse effects of such re-
gimes on innovation. The order was designed to allow Intel and its chal-
lengers to vindicate their rights in court before an independent adjudicator, 
rather than to resort either to self-help, by Intel, in which case the strong 
would almost always vanquish the weak, or to the kind of injunction, by 
Intel's challenger, that would threaten Intel's ability to conduct its busi-
ness. 
In my view, the order in Intel is the prime example of the effort by the 
FTC to pursue conventional antitrust enforcement,45 while at the same 
time tailoring its complaint and order so as not to undermine incentives to 
innovate in the first place. 
c. Standard Setting by Private Agreement - Dell Computer46 
Standard setting, often under the auspices of a trade association, can 
facilitate innovation. On the other hand, private standard setting, precisely 




45. For similar enforcement efforts in non-intellectual property contexts, see, for 
example, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); 
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). For a discussion of significant 
factual and legal differences between the Commission's Intel case and the separate pri-
vate antitrust case brought against Intel by Intergraph, see Debra A. Valentine, Abuse of 
Dominance in Relation to Intellectual Property: U.S. Perspectives and the Intel Cases, 
Speech Delivered at the Israel International Antitrust Conference (Nov. 15, 1999), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvisraelin.htm. 
46. Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
47. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496 (1988) 
(finding that the nation's largest producer of steel conduit packed an annual meeting with 
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In Dell Computer, the Commission alleged that Dell had abused the 
power conferred by its patent by failing to disclose its patent rights during 
a standard-setting process and then threatening to enforce those rights 
against others involved in that process.48 Dell was a member of the Video 
Electronics Standards Association ("VESA"), a nonprofit standard-setting 
organization composed of virtually all major U.S. computer hardware and 
software manufacturers.49 VESA had been in the process of setting a de-
sign standard for a computer part ("VL-Bus") that carried information or 
instructions between a computer's central processing unit and peripheral 
devices.50 A Dell representative certified in writing that "this proposal 
does not infringe on any trademarks, copyrights, or patents" possessed by 
Dell.51 After VESA adopted a standard, Dell informed several VESA 
members that implementation of the VL-Bus would be a violation of 
Dell's intellectual property rights. 52 
The Commission's complaint alleged that the "bait-and-switch tactics" 
adopted by Dell threatened to retard the development and adoption of 
standards in this particular matter and to discourage efficient standard-
setting efforts in the future. 53 In a consent agreement, Dell agreed not to 
enforce its patent against computer manufacturers incorporating VL-Bus 
design, nor to enforce in the future any patent rights that it intentionally 
failed to disclose upon request of any standard-setting organization during 
the standard-setting process.54 The remedy was designed to maintain in-
centives to innovate created by patent law by leaving in place Dell's patent 
rights for all purposes other than enforcement against competitors who had 
relied on the apparently open industry standard. 
The enforcement action and the order aimed to protect the integrity of 
the private standard-setting process, itself an essential device to help in-
troduce new products, without punitive action against Dell's patent. 
new association members whose only function was to vote against approval of a standard 
that would allow a potential competitor into the market). 
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D. Horizontal Mergers and Claims of Efflciencl, - LillylSepracor,55 
Ciba-GeigylSandoz56 and GlaxolSmith-Kline 7 
It has become commonplace for companies that control overlapping or 
complementary intellectual property to defend proposed horizontal merg-
ers or joint ventures on grounds that the combined entity will be able to 
innovate or introduce innovative products more promptly and efficiently. 
Where levels of concentration or entry barriers are low, the Commission 
routinely allows such mergers or joint ventures. One example among 
many, Lilly/Sepracor, epitomizes the technical and predictive difficulties 
that antitrust enforcers face in an intellectual property context. In that case, 
Lilly, a manufacturer of the block-buster drug Prozac, sought an exclusive 
license to the rights to a follow-on and allegedly superior product. It was 
uncertain whether the follow-on drug would be approved by the FDA, 
how soon it would come to market, whether and to what extent Lilly's 
patent on Prozac would have blocked marketing of the follow-on drug, 
and whether it represented a meaningful advance over Prozac. Speaking 
for myself, I chose not to challenge the arrangement. Prozac faced several 
other competitors, and there was a range of other generic manufacturers 
ready to challenge Prozac when it went off patent. Also, Lilly's distribu-
tion resources and scientific expertise made it likely that Lilly would bring 
this new drug to the market much more promptly than would otherwise be 
the case. 
On the other hand, where market shares and concentration are high and 
the merger is likely to leave only one or two sources of a product, effi-
ciencies, including effects on innovation, should almost never justify the 
merger. For example, in December 1996, the Commission issued a con-
sent order restricting a proposed merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, 
the two leading commercial developers of gene therapy products. 58 At that 
time, the two firms were engaged in rival research, development and test-
ing efforts that were expected to yield significant improvements in the 
treatment of cancer and other diseases and medical conditions by the year 
2000. In order to ensure that the merger would not slow R&D or raise 
prices for gene therapy products closest to market, the consent order re-
quired, among other things, the licensing of a package of gene therapy 
technology, know-how, and patent rights to a third party so that it would 
55. There is no public record of Lilly/Sepracor. 
56. In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., No. 961-0055, 1996 F.T.C. LEXIS 701 (Dec. 15, 1996). 
57. In re Glaxo Wellcome PLC, No. C-3990, 2000 F.T.C. LEXIS 172 (Dec. 18, 
2000). 
58. Ciba-Geigy, 1996 F.T.C. LEXIS 701. 
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be in a position to compete against the combined firm.59 The Commission 
faced a similar situation in the merger of Glaxo and Smith-Kline 
Beecham, where the Commission required the parties to assign intellectual 
property rights to an acquirer to prevent extreme concentration in the mar-
ket.6o 
Mergers to monopoly or near-monopoly, especially when the product 
has already been developed and is near the marketing stage, threaten to 
cause short-term anticonsumer effects in intellectual property markets just 
as they would in markets generally. Requiring that a second firm be set up 
in the market, thus restoring the competition lost as a result of the merger, 
is designed to ensure that competition at least plays some role in future 
developments in the market. 
E. Vertical Mergers and Claims of Efficiency - Silicon Graphics61 
In 1995, the Commission reached a consent with Silicon Graphics, Inc. 
("SGI") that allowed two acquisitions to proceed while at the same time 
addressing vertical foreclosure concerns that threatened to eliminate inno-
vation competition. According to the Commission's complaint, SGI, the 
dominant provider of entertainment graphics workstations with a 90 per-
cent market share, had proposed to acquire Alias and Wavefront, two of 
the three dominant developers of Unix-based entertainment graphics and 
animation software that operate on those workstations.62 The Commission 
was concerned about vertical foreclosure in both directions. Rival work-
station manufacturers would not be able to compete effectively if Alias 
and Wavefront were to design their software to be compatible only with 
SGI's workstations.63 At the same time, rival entertainment graphics soft-
ware manufacturers would be foreclosed from 90 percent of a market if 
SGI were to close its previously open software interface so that only Alias 
and Wavefront would be able to design compatible software.64 The Com-
mission also was concerned that if SGI were to allow Alias and Wavefront 
to continue to work with rival workstation manufacturers to develop com-
plementary products, SGI would be able to use proprietary information 
received in the course of those efforts to obtain an unfair competitive ad-
vantage over workstation competitors.65 
59. Id. 
60. Glaxo Wellcome, 2000 F.T.C. LEXIS 172. 
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On the other hand, there were strong indications that the combination 
of SOl, Alias, and Wavefront's complementary capacities would lead to 
important innovation. In order to maintain competition, while at the same 
time allowing the achievement of these potential efficiencies, the Com-
mission negotiated a consent order that allowed the merger to proceed 
subject to three main conditions.66 First, in order to preserve workstation 
competition, the Commission required the merged entity to enter into a 
Commission-approved porting agreement with a workstation competitor 
under which SOl would be required to use best efforts to ensure optimal 
interoperation of Alias' leading software programs with the competitor's 
workstations.67 Second, in order to keep competition fair, the order in-
cluded a firewall provision prohibiting the transfer to SOl of the work-
station competitor's proprietary information.68 Finally, in order to main-
tain software competition, the order required SOl to maintain an open ar-
chitecture and publish its application programming interfaces for its work-
stations, and to refrain from discriminating against outside software rivals 
of Alias and Wavefront.69 
The order was admittedly "regulatory," including an on-going supervi-
sory role for the Commission, which is usually best avoided. The alterna-
tive, however, would have been to block a vertical merger in a dynamic 
sector of the economy that offered exceptionally strong prospects for in-
novation. 
F. Duration of Orders - Inte(O and AOUTime Warner71 
As noted earlier in this discussion, because areas of the economy char-
acterized by intellectual property usually are dynamic and fast-changing, 
predictions are not always reliable. On the other hand, it is often the case 
that antitrust enforcers must intervene at an early point in order to be ef-
fective, because once mergers or other transactions lead to a dominant 
market position, restoration of competition may be very difficult, or even 
impossible, to achieve. Since prompt intervention is necessary and perfect ' 
foresight impossible, a long-term remedy set in stone can be highly coun-
terproducti ve. 
Until six years ago, antitrust orders entered by the FTC were perma-





70. In re Intel, No. 9288, 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 145 (Aug. 6, 1999). 
71. In re Am. Online, Inc., No. C-3989, 2000 FTC LEXIS 170 (Dec. 14,2000). 
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changed circumstances of fact or law.72 In 1995 the Commission changed 
its policy and adopted a twenty-year cap on all antitrust orders.73 
Even twenty years can be an unacceptably long duration for an order 
when high technology is concerned. As a result, the Commission, largely 
on its own initiative, has curtailed the duration of several of its orders in 
the high-technology sector to less than twenty years. For example, the 
Commission settlement in Intel, discussed earlier, limited the duration to 
ten years because of the fast-changing nature of competition in microproc-
essor design.74 
A more striking example can be found in the recent settlement of the 
proposed merger of America Online and Time Warner. There, the product 
markets alleged to be likely affected by the merger included broadband 
Internet connections over cable (the way most residential broadband sub-
scribers currently access the Internet) and "interactive television" - a new 
technology that will permit expanded viewer choice of the forms of enter-
tainment and information received over cable.75 AOL and Time Warner 
argued to the Commission that broadband connections over cable were 
already challenged competitively and would increasingly be challenged by 
broadband connections over di~ital subscriber lines ("DSL"), by satellite, 
and through wireless devices. 6 As to interactive television, the parties 
noted that though widely regarded as an important innovation, interactive 
television was largely in the developmental stage.77 Given the uncertainty 
of developments in these areas and the dynamic quality of innovation, the 
Commission elected to limit the duration of all provisions of its order to 
five years78 - the shortest duration of a competition order of which I am 
aware. 
Of course, it is possible that the market will develop in unexpected 
ways such that competition problems would become more, rather than 
less, serious five or ten years after an order is entered. If those problems 
are created by illegal competitive behavior, there are other provisions of 
the antitrust laws that will come into play.79 On the other hand, if domi-
nance is achieved solely as a result of the superior skill and energy of the 
72. 16 C.F.R. § 3.72 (2000). 
73. 16 c.F.R. § 3.72 (b)(3) (2000). 
74. Intel, 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 145. 
75. Am. Online, 2000 F.T.C. LEXIS 170. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at *56. 
79. See, e.g., section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.c. § 2 (1994) (monopolization). 
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merged entity, then neither the antitrust authorities nor consumers would 
have much about which to complain. 
G. Conclusions to Be Drawn from the above Cases 
Obviously I am not objective since every one of the enforcement and 
nonenforcement decisions described in this section was voted upon by the 
FTC in the past six years,80 most unanimously. Nevertheless, as exempli-
fied by the above cases, there is a good deal of evidence that in fashioning 
complaints and orders in cases that involve intellectual property, the FTC 
has tried to ensure that conventional antitrust enforcement is sensitive to 
incentives to innovate. In some instances the enforcement action itself was 
designed to discourage behavior alleged to suppress other people's intel-
lectual property rights (e.g., Intel). In others it was designed to pursue 
conventional enforcement, but with attention to avoid overreaching that 
would undermine incentives to innovate (e.g., AOUFime Warner). 
v. SOME INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
In a recent paper Judge Richard Posner raised, in his usual thoughtful 
way, questions about whether the institutional structure of antitrust en-
forcement is adequate to deal with the pace of development and type of 
issues likely to be encountered in the New Economy.81 In addressing such 
institutional questions, one cannot help but think of the debacle of the U.S. 
government monopolization case against IBM, in which IBM at the time 
represented the cutting edge of high-technology innovation. After several 
years of investigation, the government (Iled its lawsuit in 1969. After 
seven years of discovery and six years of trial, including a trial presenta-
tion that covered 104,000 pages of transcript, the government in 1982 
dismissed the case - almost certainly correctly - on grounds, among others, 
that by that time IBM was no longer a monopolist. 82 
In addition to raising the issue of speed of review, antitrust enforce-
ment actions involving high technology raise questions that are unusually 
complicated and highly technical: for example, whether new technologies 
80. I have been the Chainnan of the FTC since April 1995. 
81. Posner, supra note 3. 
82. See Post-Mortem on IBM Case Provides Forum for Conflicting Perspectives, 
1051 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), 310, 310-11 (Feb. 19, 1982); United States v. 
IBM, 52 Civ. 72-344, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5829 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1997) ("It has been 
established beyond any real question that, whereas IBM fonnerly had a great deal of 
market power in an antitrust sense, that market power has been substantially diminished, 
and is continuing to diminish, to the point of its disappearance in the sense of a threat of 
antitrust violation."), aff'd, 163 F.3d 737 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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are likely to persist in the face of future competition, or whether a highly 
technical chip was designed to preclude a particular form of competition. 
As the IBM example illustrates, investigations and cases tend to be long 
compared to other forms of civil litigation because questions of cause and 
competitive effect are exceptionally complicated. Is antitrust up to the 
challenge? 
A. Speed of Review 
It is usually in everyone's interest - producers, consumers, and gov-
ernment - to review and resolve cases promptly. On the other hand, law 
enforcement can rarely equal the speed of economic change in high-
technology sectors. Fact-finding, especially when developed through an 
adversarial process before decision makers who are not technically 
trained, is bound to be slow. All the government can hope to do is reduce 
delay to the maximum extent possible without short-changing consumers 
or undermining the rights of respondents. 
In terms of efficient review, much progress has been achieved in re-
cent years in the area of merger enforcement. Ninety-seven percent of 
mergers filed with the Department of Justice and the FTC are cleared 
without a "second request" (i.e., without extensive factual inquiry),83 and 
of transactions where a second request is issued, the parties are in court or 
the investigation is closed in the vast majority of instances within 120 
days.84 
If the Commission decides to challenge a transaction in court, it usu-
ally proceeds by preliminary injunction so that the initial trial is completed 
within a matter of months after a complaint issues. If the Commission 
thereafter elects to proceed along the administrative route and litigate the 
case within the agency, it may adopt a "fast track" procedure, to which the 
parties must consent, with the result that the elapsed time from complaint 
to Commission decision does not exceed thirteen months.85 
A comparable improvement in the speed of review and litigation needs 
to occur in the non-merger area. My impression is that the enforcement 
agencies and the courts are aware that it is essential to move things along, 
and improvement is occurring. 
83. FTC BUREAU OF COMPETITION & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION, 
ANNUAL REpORT TO CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 1999, PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION(J) OF 
SECTION 7 A OF THE CLAYTON ACT, app. A, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/08/hsrapp99.pdf. 
84. This is not available in any public record. 
85. 16 C.F.R. § 3.IIA(c)(l), (3) (2000). 
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B. Technology Challenges 
Antitrust enforcement has often faced the challenge of dealing with 
complicated technological questions - for example in patent litigation or 
review of standard-setting results. I can testify better than most that there 
has never been a time when so many highly technical questions, best ad-
dressed by people with advanced training in chemistry, biology, and engi-
neering, needed to be resolved in order to deal with antitrust issues. 
Few government enforcement officials, administrators, or judges have 
sufficient technical competence to deal directly with those issues, so it is 
necessary to tum to experts. As Judge Posner notes, relatively few lawyers 
and economists have scientific training and those who do can command 
vastly better levels of income in the private sector than in the govern-
ment.86 There are competent experts in the private sector, but many are 
either on the payroll of high-technology companies or they hope to be in 
the future and so avoid government connections. I fully acknowledge the 
problem identified by Judge Posner. 
The situation is not entirely bleak, however. Government lawyers and 
economists, after exposure to the technology of a particular sector, learn in 
the process of doing and are better equipped to handle a later, similar case. 
Also, some technically sophisticated lawyers and economists, blind to the 
virtues of wealth maximization, remain with the government for extended 
periods, and even an entire career, because they prefer service in the pub-
lic sector. In addition, some technical experts from outside government do 
commonly serve as consultants and expert witnesses on government litiga-
tion teams, or as trustees appointed to oversee compliance with consent 
decrees. Finally, and perhaps most important, the FTC has turned to other 
agencies in government - the National Institute of Health with respect to 
biotechnology, the Federal Communications Commission for communica-
tions expertise, and the Food and Drug Administration for help on phar-
maceutical mergers - and has in that way found invaluable assistance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This discussion is primarily about the need to adjust competition poli-
cies to the realities of the "New Economy." I have argued that the New 
Economy is not so new as to render obsolete the sound principles of com-
petition that have guided antitrust over the years, but new enough to pose 
some substantial challenges. While much remains to be done, both sub-
stantively and institutionally, my contention is that antitrust has made sig-
86. Posner, supra note 3, at 7. 
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nificant progress in understanding the New Economy, and adjusting its 
policies and procedures to take more fully into account the need to protect 
both incentives and opportunities to innovate, and the need to keep up 
with a dynamic marketplace. At least as important, there is a need, 
touched upon only briefly here, to revisit intellectual property policy to 
assess whether intellectual property protection has expanded in a way that 
threatens the appropriate balance between property rights and competition. 
